This paper applies a model of market power measurement under product differentiation to the case of the gasoline market in California, using data for the period 1983-1989. Our results show that there is a considerable degree of product differentiation among major brands. This allows firms to exercise local market power over their own specific products, but there are also signals of an important degree of global market power. However, none of the four pure market structures analyzed (price taking, monopolistic competition, Cournot oligopoly and collusion) seems able to explain by itself the behavior of the whole market. JEL Classification Numbers: C33, L13, L71.
Product Differentiation and Market Power in the California Gasoline Market (#)
by Germán Coloma (*) The aim of this paper is to apply a model of market power measurement under product differentiation to the case of the gasoline market in California. In doing so, we attempt to answer four basic questions: a) Is there product differentiation in the California gasoline market? b) Does that differentiation influence the way in which firms exercise their market power? c) Do those differentiation and market power change according to location and type of gasoline sold? d) Which market structure explains the behavior of the industry better?
In order to answer those questions, we use a data set that contains price information by brand for the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . We also use data on quantity, capacity and number of outlets by firm for approximately the same moments, and additional information on industry-average and economy-wide variables.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we describe the basic characteristics of the gasoline market in California for the period under study. In the second, we present the theoretical model that we use to answer our questions. In the third, we analyze the empirical results that we obtain. Finally, the fourth section summarizes the main conclusions of the paper.
The California gasoline market
The California gasoline market is clearly one of the largest in the United States of America. Using data of January 1986, for example, we observe that California is the state with the second largest consumption of motor gasoline and the third largest operating refining capacity in the country. Those figures imply an 11% of the total consumption and a 15% of the total refining capacity, and they are obviously not surprising if we consider that California is the state with the largest population (11%) and the largest number of motor vehicles (11%) in the U.S.
California is also unique in the sense that it is a relatively isolated market in relationship with the rest of the United States. Due partly to physical limitations which constrain the possibility of extending pipelines to connect the state with the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, California relies heavily on its own refining capacity to satisfy its demand for gasoline 1 . This feature makes it an interesting case to study, since many of the movements that we observe in prices and quantities can be considered as endogenous to the state's characteristics.
The basic data for the gasoline market in California between January 1983 and January 1989 can be seen in table 1. During that period, consumption of motor gasoline averaged around one billion gallons per month and followed an increasing trend that only slowed down in 1985 and was particularly fast in 1986. These movements could be related to the slight increase in prices that occurred in the first of those years, and to the large decrease that those prices experienced in the latter 2 . The operating refining capacity was always around 2.2 millions of barrels per calendar day, exhibiting a decreasing trend between 1983 and 1985 and remaining relatively constant between 1986 and 1989. These movements are partly explained by the entry and exit of small and medium-size firms during those years, the shutdown of a number of refineries and the increase in the capacity of others. Considered jointly with the changes in gasoline consumption (and, consequently, in production) , the result was an important increase in the coefficient of capacity utilization, which grew from 71% to 92% of the operating refining capacity.
Another structural trend which can be observed in table 1 is a decrease in the number of retail gasoline outlets, which implies an increase in the average outlet size (measured by quantity sold divided by number of outlets). This phenomenon may be related to the increasing diffusion of larger self-serve gasoline stations and the increasing use of credit cards, about which we have no statistical data available. 1 In fact, this is common to the whole U.S. Pacific coast. See Henry, Potter and Town (1995) . 2 The main source for table 1 is the Quarterly Oil Report, published by the California Energy Commission. The data on capacities come from the Petroleum Supply Annual (Energy Information Administration), while the information about retail outlets is taken from the National Petroleum News Annual Factbook. These three publications are also the sources for table 2 and figures 1 and 2. The behavior of prices during the period 1983-1989 can be seen in figure 1 , where we represent the average quarterly price for a gallon of regular unleaded self-serve gasoline in California in cents per gallon without taxes. Both the retail and the wholesale price exhibit similar behaviors, oscillating around a constant trend between 1983 and 1985, falling steadily during 1986, and reaching a new average level between 1987 and 1989. The price of crude oil (measured by the wellhead price at the Kern River and also translated into cents per gallon) experiences an even more abrupt decrease in 1986, and after that, its oscillations become larger than the ones observed for the gasoline price. Conversely, between 1983 and 1985 its level is almost constant around 48 cents per gallon (20 US$/barrel).
Another important characteristic of the gasoline market in California is given by its degree of concentration. Although the number of refining firms changed considerably during the period under study, these changes only affected relatively minor companies. The seven major refiners that were operating in California remained the same: Arco, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Shell, Texaco and Unocal. Their relative market shares were also considerably stable, with Arco and Chevron being the largest distributors, followed by Shell and Unocal, and then trailed by Texaco, Mobil and Exxon. The only important acquisition took place in December 1984, when Texaco bought the assets of Getty Refining and Marketing Co. and increased its refining capacity by 50%. Table 2 illustrates the structure of the California gasoline market, by reporting three different measures of the degree of concentration. These measures are the joint market share of the seven major refiners with respect to total quantity, total operating capacity and number of branded outlets. Although the three measures are considerably different, they all share the same trend, which implies a relatively large increase between 1983 and 1986 and a stabilization of the percentages between 1986 and 1989. The larger market share with respect to distributed quantity versus the one with respect to capacity may be due to a higher utilization coefficient by the major refiners. Conversely, the even larger share that they exhibit in the number of branded outlets may be originated in the fact that some minor refiners only sell unbranded gasoline to large consumers who do not use retail outlets. The relative increase in the major refiners' market share through time is clearly represented by the series of data graphed in figure 2, where we observe the quarterly movements of gasoline supply from 1983 to 1989. In that diagram we see that while the minor refiners follow a slightly decreasing but relatively stable trend along time, the major refiners are the ones who experience almost all the seasonal variations from one quarter to the other. Besides, the jump in quantity during 1986 is only visible for the major refiners, whose output tends to oscillate around a higher level during 1987 and 1988. Most of the features already described are incorporated into the data set that we use to capture the degree of product differentiation and market power in the California gasoline market between 1983 and 1989. The basic source for that data set is a series of price statistics prepared by Lundberg Survey Inc 3 . All the observations are collected in the first two weeks of January of each year, and cover seven cities (Bakersfield, Fresno, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco and Stockton). The data are classified by brand (each of the seven majors, plus the average of the minors in each city) and type of gasoline (leaded or unleaded, regular or premium, full-serve or self-serve). Each observation contains information about the retail price, the wholesale price, the apparent retail margin (defined as retail price minus wholesale price minus taxes) and the number of gasoline stations surveyed for that information. Combining the different dimensions that we have information about (seven moments in time, seven cities, eight brands, and eight different types of gasoline) we are able to construct a database with 2121 observations. The data on quantities are taken from the gasoline distributions published by the Department of Business Taxes of California. This gives us monthly data about the total taxable gallons that each firm distributes, both through resellers and through company outlets. In order to make quantities comparable to prices, we calculated the average monthly quantity between the January data and the previous December data. We therefore obtained eight quantities per year (the seven majors plus the total quantity distributed by the minor refiners), having 56 observations in total. We were not able to disaggregate our data by city or by type of gasoline.
The same number of annual observations is used for the information about operating refining capacities and number of branded outlets. For the first of those, our source is the Petroleum Supply Annual, published by the Energy Information Administration (U.S. Department of Energy). For the data on outlets, the data come from the National Petroleum News Annual Factbook. The former refers to the capacity of all the refineries located in California measured in barrels of crude oil per calendar day, and corresponds to January 1st of each year. The latter is the result of an independent survey performed during the first quarter of each year and published in the month of May.
The additional information consists of series of seven observations (one for each moment in time), taken from various sources. These include the price of crude oil at Kern River (for which we use the last price for December of the previous year), the average national hourly wage for refineries' workers, the national consumer price index, a national index of labor productivity for refineries, the population of California, the number of registered vehicles in California, the personal income per capita in the state, the level of federal and state excise taxes on gasoline, the state-wide coefficient of capacity utilization, and the total stock of finished motor gasoline in California at the beginning of each year. For some of this information (population, income, labor productivity), we average data from consecutive years. For some other (wages, CPI, vehicles), we use the figures which correspond to January or to the end of the previous year. 
Specification of the model
The kind of product differentiation which we will analyze for the California gasoline market can be described as a situation where consumers distinguish two basic elements in the price of the product: a homogeneous component and an idiosyncratic component. The homogeneous component is shared by all the available brands, and changes identically when we vary the objective characteristics of the good (i.e, type, grade, service, location). The idiosyncratic component has to do more with the "value of the brand", and may be different for each of the firms that compete in the market 4 . Based on the description of the industry that we did in the previous section, we assume that the gasoline supplied by minor refiners only has a homogeneous component, while the one distributed by major refiners also possesses an idiosyncratic element. As the dimensions of this type of product differentiation cannot be associated with a particular location in a product space, we assume that differentiation is symmetric or "non-address". Using a linear specification, this implies that the demand price function for each particular major brand of gasoline under complete differentiation (CD) can be written in the following way:
where "p it " is the price of the ith brand at time "t", "q it " is the corresponding quantity, "Q t " is the total quantity traded in the market, "Y t " is a vector of exogenous demand-shifting variables, and "α 0 ", "α 1 ", "α 2 ", "α 3i " and "α 4 " are parameters to be estimated. The first bracket of this expression represents the homogeneous value of the good, while the second stands for the idiosyncratic component. Note that "α 0 ", "α 1 " and "α 2 " are assumed to be the same for all the available brands in the market, while "α 3i " is allowed to vary by brand. Finally, "α 4 " is also assumed to be identical for all brands, although this is done only to improve the precision of the estimated parameter.
To check if this type of product differentiation is indeed suitable to characterize the California gasoline market, we contrast our specification with two alternative hypotheses, that we call "brand substitutability" (BS) and "perfect substitutability" (PS). The first of them assumes that the gasoline produced by major refiners is perceived as different from the one produced by minor refiners, but that it is perfectly substitutable among major brands. The second implies that gasoline is a homogeneous product, so that no idiosyncratic component exists in its demand price. These two alternative hypotheses can be expressed in the following way:
where "Q mt " is the total quantity supplied by major refiners at time "t".
As we see, the basic property of the hypothesis of brand substitutability is that the demand price function that major refiners face is a function of the total quantity that those refiners produce, a dependence that is absent in the other two hypotheses. If there actually is complete product differentiation, it is the quantity produced by each individual major refiner the one that enters in the demand price function. On the contrary, in the case of perfect substitutability, the idiosyncratic component is absent.
The existence of product differentiation of the type that we described may also have an impact on the exercise of market power by the firms that operate in the market. In order to measure that market power, we first define the marginal cost of the firm that produces the ith brand as a linear function which depends on a set of cost-shifting exogenous variables (w it ) related to prices of inputs, characteristics of the good and other production conditions. Therefore we write:
where "β 0i " and "β 1 " are the corresponding parameters. If we assume that firms try to maximize profits, this marginal cost is equated to the marginal revenue that they perceive. However, the perception of this marginal revenue is influenced by the kind of product differentiation that they are able to impose, and also by the type of market structure that they face. If we assume a context of complete differentiation, for example, firms may be able to exercise a certain market power on the idiosyncratic component of the demand price, as well as another type of market power that is more related to their possibility of influencing the homogeneous component. We refer to the first of those types as "local market power", and to the second as "global market power".
Given these definitions, we consider four pure market structures in which firms are able to exercise their influence on price in different ways: price taking, monopolistic competition, Cournot oligopoly and collusion. In the first of those structures (PT), firms exert no market power at all, and therefore their perceived marginal revenue is equal to their demand price. By monopolistic competition (MC) we define a situation in which the major refiners use all their local market power but have no global market power. Under Cournot oligopoly (OL) firms exercise global market power partially, by taking into account the effect of changes in individual supplies on the homogeneous component of price but ignoring possible responses by other firms. Finally, in a situation of collusion (CL) we assume that the whole set of firms decides the quantities produced by each company, so that both local and global market powers are fully exercised.
According to the previous description, the definition of marginal revenue for each of the proposed market structures under a linear specification is the following:
These assumptions allow us to estimate a supply price relationship for each of the alternative market structures, which comes from equating each "MR it " with the already defined expression for "MC it ". This implies that:
To estimate the parameters of the demand and supply price relationships for a particular assumption about product differentiation and market power, we run a simultaneous regression model in which we introduce certain restrictions to the value of the parameters in the two equations that we want to estimate. Those restrictions come from the presence of demand parameters (α 2 , α 4 ) in the supply price relationships, linked to the existence of global and local market power. An alternative approach that we also use is to allow for mixed structures in which there are variable degrees of market power. In that case, we estimate the following supply price relationship:
where "θ" is a measure of the degree of global market power and "µ" is a measure of the degree of local market power. To calculate these parameters, we regress the supply and demand price relationships simultaneously and then divide the estimated supply equation coefficients for "Q t " and "q it " by the corresponding demand equation coefficients. What we obtain are values whose range should be between zero and one. Three of our four pure market structures are particular cases of this more general specification, since under price taking "θ = 0" and "µ = 0", under monopolistic competition "θ = 0" and "µ = 1", and under collusion "θ = 1" and "µ = 1".
Empirical results
The empirical implementation of the model described in the previous section is performed through a series of steps that attempt to test several implications. First of all, we look for the existence of product differentiation by specifying the demand price function for gasoline under our three alternative demand hypotheses. Then we estimate a general model of market power by running a system of demand and supply price equations, for which we calculate parameters of local and global market power. That system is later tested for changes across different sub-markets, by looking at how market power parameters vary when we separately consider the different types of gasoline and the different cities. Finally, we estimate our general model imposing restrictions related to the four pure market structures already described, and evaluate their relative likelihood.
Product differentiation
As we mentioned in the previous section, the existence and type of product differentiation is basically a characteristic of the demand side of the model. The methodology followed, therefore, consists of regressing three alternative specifications for a demand price equation that respectively represent the hypotheses of complete differentiation, brand substitutability and perfect substitutability.
In order to make our results comparable, the three equations are regressed against the same series of independent variables plus different versions of the quantity variable which distinguish each hypothesis from the others. The number of observations used equals the number of retail prices that we have in our database (2121 observations), which include all the taxes that consumers pay when they buy the product. Each price refers to a different brand (and to the set of "minor refiners" taken together), a different type of gasoline (leaded or unleaded, regular or premium, self-serve or full-serve) and a different city. The common set of regressors includes 10 dummy variables (one for unleaded gasoline, one for premium gasoline, one for full-serve gasoline and one for each of the seven cities) and 4 variables that change annually and are common to all cities, types and brands. These are the personal income per capita, the number of vehicles per capita, the total number of gasoline outlets per capita and the national consumer price index.
In addition to those 14 variables, the regression under complete differentiation includes one dummy variable for each major brand, one variable for total quantity per capita, and another for individual quantity per capita for each major brand. This last variable has a zero value for the observations which refer to minor refiners, as a way to show that for those refiners the idiosyncratic component of consumers' valuation is absent. The regression for the hypothesis of brand substitutability does not have a dummy variable for each brand, but it has one for the major refiners as a whole. It also includes total quantity per capita and total majors' quantity per capita, the last of which has zero value for the minor refiners. This feature captures the idea that the idiosyncratic component is the same for all the majors but does not exist for the minors. The regression under perfect substitutability, finally, does not include any brand-specific dummy at all, and only introduces total quantity per capita in addition to the common set of variables 5 . The use of a linear least squares specification seems a natural choice for our model, since price is essentially a continuous variable whose homogeneous and idiosyncratic components are additive. However, we make two important departures from the classical OLS model: we deal with endogeneity of the independent variables and we include weighting factors in the regressions. This last correction implies using the number of gasoline stations surveyed for each observation to assess the relative importance of that observation. The endogeneity problem is solved by the standard two-stage least square procedure of defining instrumental variables. The variables that require this correction are all the quantities, because in fact these are the variables that consumers choose in the market. To deal with this issue, we run a series of preliminary regressions and keep their fitted values to be used afterwards. For both total quantity and majors' quantity, the regressions are run against population, vehicles, price of crude, wage, labor productivity and a constant. For individual quantity, the regressors are the seven major brand dummies, six annual dummies and a constant. We also instrument the total number of outlets, which is exogenous for the demand side of the market but endogenous for the supply side. In all cases the goodness of fit is very good, mostly because the number of observations which differ one from the other is small.
The basic results for the three alternative demand price regressions can be seen in table 3. In general, the values seem to be sensible, since we obtain highly significant coefficients for almost all the variables and the signs are practically always the ones expected. Income per capita and CPI, for example, turn out to have a positive impact on price, and this can be interpreted as a sign that gasoline is a normal good and a gross substitute of the other goods in the economy. The positive sign in the coefficient of outlets per capita may be interpreted as the result of a location effect, whereas the positive effect of vehicles per capita probably comes from the fact that a larger number of vehicles shifts the demand for gasoline up. The interpretation of the coefficients related to the dummy variables that typify our product is also intuitively nice. They indicate that consumers are willing to pay almost 7 cents more for unleaded gasoline, 14 cents more for premium gasoline and between 29 and 30 cents more for full service. These numbers change very little among our three specifications.
When we turn to the measurement of the idiosyncratic components of the major brands, however, our regressions produce very different results. Under the hypothesis of complete differentiation (CD), we find coefficients for the majors' dummy variables that average almost 18 cents per gallon and are positive for all the brands. Except for one of those coefficients (which is nevertheless significant at a level of 10%), they are all significant at a level of 2% or more. More importantly, the coefficient of individual majors' quantity has the expected negative sign, although it is not significant at a level of 5% or less. This situation changes dramatically if we look at the implications of the hypothesis of brand substitutability (BS), where consumers value the major brands negatively (-55.9 cents per gallon) but their demand for the idiosyncratic component has a positive slope. Moreover, the fact that the R-squared coefficient under BS is only slightly higher than the one under perfect substitutability makes us think that its specification is not correct. Conversely, the relatively larger gain that we obtain when we introduce complete differentiation acts as a point in favor for this hypothesis, which is the one that we adopt to derive additional implications from the model. The choice of CD as our preferred hypothesis is also supported by a series of Cox tests that we perform for each hypothesis against the other two, whose results appear on table 4. The procedure that those tests follow consists of running a regression for the residuals of one alternative hypothesis on the regressors of another 6 . We then construct a normally distributed statistic using the estimated variances of those residuals, together with the variances of the dependent variable under the two original regressions. If this statistic is not significant (i.e, if it is sufficiently small), then the original hypothesis is rejected. The values obtained show that the hypothesis of complete differentiation cannot be rejected against any of the other two for any reasonable degree of significance. Conversely, the hypothesis of perfect substitutability is rejected at all possible levels both against CD and BS, while this last hypothesis is rejected against CD but not against PS.
Demand, supply and market power
Having chosen the hypothesis of complete product differentiation as our preferred demand specification, our next step consists of finding a suitable functional form for the supply relationship. This is the task that we pursue in this section, where we use a general approach to market power measurement by estimating values for the local and global parameters "µ" and "θ". These values are later tested for several structural variations, by introducing separate estimations by gasoline type, grade and service, and also by letting the parameters vary by city.
Our first specification for the supply relationship follows the same methodology that we use for the demand side of the model (weighted two-stage least squares). The dependent variable is the net price without taxes, which is equivalent to the sum of the wholesale price and the apparent retail margin. The set of independent variables includes the same 17 6 In fact, the original Cox test procedure also includes an intermediate regression for the predicted values under the null hypothesis on the regressors of the alternative hypothesis. This step is omitted because in several cases we obtain a perfect fit under that specification. For details about the procedure used, see the appendix. dummies used for estimating demand under the CD hypothesis, plus 4 cost-shifting variables which are the price of crude oil, the coefficient of capacity utilization, the operating refining capacity and the average outlet size. The last two variables differ by year and by brand, while the other two are taken as common to all brands at each moment of time 7 . Finally, we also include total quantity and individual quantity per capita, whose coefficients are the base to estimate the market power parameters. Once again, the latter of those variables is not included for the observations that refer to minor refiners, whose degree of product differentiation (and hence local market power) is assumed to be null. Four variables are instrumented because of possible endogeneity problems: the two quantities, the coefficient of capacity utilization and the average outlet size.
The third and fourth columns of table 5 show the coefficients and percentages of significance for our basic supply regression. Once again, we find very reasonable values for all the dummy variables, especially for the ones related to gasoline types and modes of service. We also find negative coefficients for all the major brands' dummies, which seem to indicate a competitive advantage in costs with respect to the minor refiners. The price of crude oil enters positively, as well as the coefficient of capacity utilization, while the two variables which measure scale (operating capacity and outlet size) show small negative effects on the supply price. Finally, the significant positive signs of the quantities per capita seem to indicate the existence of a certain degree of market power, both global and local.
An alternative methodology to estimate demand and supply price equations uses a simultaneous regression model, which not only deals with endogeneity problems but also with possible correlations between the residuals of both equations. This methodology, known as three-stage least squares, is the one that we apply to obtain the results in the last four columns of table 5. Once again, we use the number of surveyed gasoline stations as a weighting factor, and limit the number of possible iterations of the procedure to one, in order to avoid distortions in the coefficients and a large loss of fit in the estimation 8 . The use of three-stage least squares to estimate our system of price equations induces a slight decrease in the R-squared coefficients of both regressions, but produces an interesting improvement in the coefficients which correspond to individual quantities per capita, which now become significant at all possible levels. With the help of this methodology we can also estimate market power parameters, by dividing the supply coefficients by the demand coefficients for the two quantity variables. However, we need to include a correction related to the existence of taxes, because the demand equation uses prices with taxes and the supply equation uses prices without taxes. As a large portion of those taxes are defined as a constant sum per gallon of gasoline, we only apply the correction for the part that corresponds to ad valorem sales taxes, which averages 7% of the net price 9 . Therefore, before dividing the supply coefficients by the corresponding demand ones, we multiply them by 1.07. The results are an estimated global market power (θ) of 70.26% and a coefficient of local market power (µ) equal to 88.74%. These numbers are the ones that we show in table 6, where we compare the demand and market power coefficients for both "Q t " and "q it " under different geographic and product stratifications of the market.
The way to find the estimated parameters for the different sub-markets consists of running a number of alternative weighted three-stage least square regressions in which we separate out quantity variables for different cities or types of gasoline. In the first, we create separate total quantity and individual quantity variables for the observations that correspond to unleaded gasoline, and later apply a Wald test to check the restrictions that those variables have null coefficients. A similar procedure is used for the other regressions in which we include special quantity variables for premium and full-serve gasoline, and also for a regression in which six city-specific quantity variables are included 10 . The results shown in table 6 illustrate that we get very small changes in the coefficients when we treat the leaded, unleaded, regular and premium gasoline segments as separate markets, and we are by no means able to reject the hypothesis that they constitute a single market. When we look at the different cities, however, the values of the coefficients change considerably, especially for the smaller cities of the sample (Bakersfield, Fresno, Sacramento and Stockton). The largest change, however, appears when we try to estimate the global and 8 Unlike the coefficients estimated when we use simultaneous equation models without endogeneity corrections (seemingly unrelated regression equations), three-stage least square estimators do not improve their asymptotic efficiency by allowing multiple iterations. See Greene (1993) , chapter 20. 9 The other taxes consist of a state tax of 9 cents per gallon and a federal tax of 4 cents per gallon (1983), which was later increased to 9 cents per gallon (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) . 10 Note that these specific quantity variables do not refer to quantities sold in each city (or to quantities for each type of gasoline), but are simply the product of the same total and individual quantities and the corresponding dummy variables. local market power coefficients for self-serve and full-serve gasoline, whose values are well out of the range that we find in the other regressions. This phenomenon is probably due to the fact that the distinction between types of service is typically a feature of competition among gasoline stations (rather than competition among brands) which cannot be explained using neither our data set nor our theoretical model 11 .
Alternative market structures
As we mentioned when we described the specifications for our model, the different market structures that we can find in a market like the one under analysis depend on the way that firms perceive their marginal revenue functions. The general specification that we used in the previous part makes no particular assumption about that perception, and therefore allows for the measurement of market power indicators that can freely vary between zero and one. In this part we constrain our model in several forms, imposing restrictions which imply the existence of alternative market structures. This produces different sets of estimated coefficients, which correspond to the four behavioral hypotheses of price taking, monopolistic competition, Cournot oligopoly and collusion. In all cases, we maintain the assumption that the correct demand specification is one of complete product differentiation.
The behavioral restrictions under the hypothesis of price taking imply that firms 11 To model market power among self-serve and full-serve gasoline stations, it would be necessary to have data about which stations offer both types of service and which offer only one of them. Shepard (1991) presents an interesting study of this topic for the gasoline market in Boston. have neither local nor global market power. This is translated into null coefficients for both total and individual quantities per capita in the supply price equation. Under monopolistic competition, global market power is absent but local market power is fully exercised, and this implies imposing the restriction that the ratio of demand to supply individual quantity coefficients must be equal to one plus the proportional tax rate of 7%. Conversely, the ratio equated to that number under Cournot oligopoly is the one between the sum of the demand coefficients for individual and total quantities and the supply coefficient for individual quantity. Like the price-taking hypothesis, both monopolistic competition and Cournot oligopoly imply a zero value for the supply coefficient for total quantity. Finally, the idea of collusion imposes two restrictions on parameter values: both for individual quantity and for total quantity the ratio between the demand and supply coefficients must be equal to 1.07.
The basic results for our four restricted regression equation systems appear on table 7. In general, we observe that most estimated parameters do not change their values very much, and that fact can be taken as a sign that they are considerably robust to changes in model specifications. This is particularly clear for the "unleaded", "premium" and "fullserve" dummies, and also for the majority of the specific demand and cost-shifting continuous variables. The dummies for the major brands, however, show an erratic behavior when we move from one model to the other, and we observe at least two counterintuitive signs: under price taking their supply price coefficients are all positive, and under Cournot oligopoly most of their demand price coefficients are negative. Another anomaly, probably linked to the last one mentioned, is that under the Cournot oligopoly hypothesis To check the validity of the alternative market structures we first apply a Wald test to each set of restrictions of the different behavioral hypotheses. The statistics found (shown at the bottom of table 7) are in all cases large, and imply a rejection of the four hypotheses at any reasonable level of significance. This means that the differences between the results of the unrestricted model and the ones under each of the restricted regressions is almost certainly not due to sampling errors, but comes form a more fundamental aspect which is not captured by any of the alternative sets of restrictions. The margin of rejection, however, is clearly smaller for the hypothesis of collusion than for the other three specifications, and this is shown by the value of its chi-squared statistic.
An additional element of analysis is given by the Cox tests that we perform for each market structure against all the others, whose results appear on table 8. The procedure follows the same idea that we used to test the different demand specifications, with the difference that now the contrasted models consist of systems of equations rather than single-equation regressions. What we do, therefore, is running a simultaneous equation model formed by the residuals of each original system against the common set of regressors and subject to the restrictions implied by all the other alternative market structures 12 . Using the estimated variances of the residuals, together with the estimated variances of the original dependent variables under the alternative restricted regressions, we get a normally distributed statistic for which small values lead to rejection of the hypothesis under analysis.
The conclusions derived from the Cox tests performed are in a certain sense disappointing, since all market structures are rejected against all the other market structures for any percentage of significance below 19%. These results, however, seem to confirm the 12 The idea for the procedure used here is taken from Bresnahan (1987) . See the appendix for additional details. insight given by the previous Wald tests, in the sense that all the restricted models seem to fail in capturing some important element of the whole picture. The fact that the margin of rejection is always smaller for collusion and always higher for price taking, however, supports the belief that the prevailing market behavior is closer to the first of those hypothesis and certainly far away from the second one.
Conclusions
The basic conclusions of this paper can be summarized as answers to the original questions asked in the introduction. These answers can be phrased in the following way: a) The gasoline market in California between 1983 and 1989 seems to exhibit a considerable degree of product differentiation among the major brands that operate in it. This differentiation goes beyond the statistically observable characteristics of type, grade and service, and indicates the presence of idiosyncratic components in the product supplied by each major refiner. b) The existence of this product differentiation allows firms to exercise market power over their own specific products. There are, however, signals that show that they also use their influence on the market as a whole, reaching prices that seem considerably close to the ones that would prevail under collusive conditions. c) The degrees of product differentiation and market power do not vary significantly with the type and grade of the gasoline sold. However, they seem to change considerably when we analyze each city separately, being local market power smaller at the smallest cities. d) None of the four pure market structures analyzed (price taking, monopolistic competition, Cournot oligopoly and collusion) seems able to explain by itself the behavior of the whole market, although the estimated market power coefficients are closer to the collusive ones than to any of the other hypotheses. This may indicate the existence of different behavioral rules among firms and regional sub-markets, and possibly some variation along time that our data set is unable to capture.
Appendix: Cox tests statistics
In this paper, we use variations of the Cox test statistics to contrast two kinds of hypotheses: the ones about demand specification and the ones about market structure. For the first of those groups, our procedure tests unrestricted models of a single equation whose regressors are different. In all cases, we define a null hypothesis H 0 and an alternative hypothesis H 1 . Let us call the corresponding estimated variances of the dependent variable (demand price) "V 0 " and "V 1 ". Consider now a regression of the residuals of the model under H 1 on the regressors that correspond to H 0 , and denote the estimated variance of those residuals under those regressors as "V 10 ". Let us now compute the following statistic, where "n" refers to the number of observations: t n V V n V V This statistic can be seen as the division between the log-likelihood ratio between the two hypotheses and the standard deviation of that log-likelihood ratio. If H 0 is true, the asymptotic distribution of "t 01 " becomes a standard normal, which can serve as a base to reject or not reject that hypothesis. When we test alternative market structures, there are two series of residuals (for demand and supply prices) and the regressors are the same for every hypothesis, but the results are constrained by different sets of restrictions. Let us compare a null hypothesis H 0 and an alternative one H 1 , and denote the estimated variances for demands and supplies as "Vd 0 ", "Vs 0 ", "Vd 1 " and "Vs 1 ". If we now regress a simultaneous equation model of the residuals under H 1 on the common set of regressors subject to the restrictions under H 0 , we can compute new variances for those residuals that we call "Vd 10 " and "Vs 10 ". In this case, the relevant Cox test statistic is the following: and its asymptotic distribution is once again a standard normal which can be used to reject or not reject H 0 against H 1 .
